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Abstract 
The current study aimed to investigate mechanisms of emotional manipulation, by 
examining the combined predictive utility of emotional intelligence, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness and mood, within a correlational design, with an experimental 
longitudinal component.  Participants (155 male and female undergraduate students) 
completed measures of personality and emotional intelligence before undergoing a 
mood induction procedure (happy, sad, and neutral).  Participants then reported their 
ability and willingness to emotionally manipulate, as well as to adopt specific 
emotional manipulation strategies. It was hypothesised that personality and 
emotional intelligence would predict emotional manipulation, with strongest effects 
with mood-worsening and inauthentic strategies.  It was also expected that worse 
moods would be associated with greater emotional manipulation.  Hypotheses 
received mixed support.  Personality and emotional intelligence did predict 
emotional manipulation, however this did not differ across aspects of emotional 
manipulation.  Only the use of inauthentic strategies was predicted by sad moods. 
Future research could explore these findings across different contexts, in addition to 
using ability measures of emotional manipulation.  It can be concluded that 
emotional intelligence, agreeableness, and conscientiousness are predictors of 
emotional manipulation.  The current study has implicated mood as predictor for the 
first time, however further research is needed clarify its role. 
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An emotion is a series of changes in neurophysiological, physiological and 
cognitive states in response to a stimulus (Scherer, 2005).  Studying emotions is 
important as emotional responses guide our thoughts and behaviours (Izard, 2010) 
and are associated with important outcomes such as physical and mental health 
(Martins, Ramalho, & Morin, 2010).  The ability to recognise and control your own 
and others’ emotions is known as emotional intelligence, which is a construct that 
encapsulates the adaptive nature of emotional capabilities (Petrides & Furnham, 
2000).  However, other research has investigated whether positive emotional skills 
usually associated with emotional intelligence are used for malicious purposes 
(Austin, Farrelly, Black, & Moore, 2007), specifically to emotionally manipulate 
other people.  The current study aimed to identify personality trait influences in the 
emotional intelligence and emotional manipulation relationship, and further, to 
examine the role of mood in emotional manipulation for the first time.   
Models and Measures of Emotional Intelligence  
Emotional intelligence is described in the literature as an ability, or as a trait 
(Petrides, Pita, & Kokkinaki, 2007).  Salovey and Mayer (1990) conceptualised 
emotional intelligence as an ability that involves a relationship between cognitive 
processing and emotion.  That relationship is reflected in their hierarchical model of 
(Mayer & Salovey, 1997), which comprises four branches. The most basic branch 
involves emotion perception, appraisal, and expression.  The second branch 
describes using emotions to facilitate thought.  Branch three incorporates analysing 
complex emotions, and the fourth branch describes emotional self-regulation and 
emotional management of others to promote adaptive outcomes (Mayer & Salovey, 
1997). As Salovey and Mayer (1990) conceptualised emotional intelligence as the 
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ability to perform emotion related tasks, they assessed performance on tasks as 
correct or incorrect as determined by panel-derived expert criterion convergence.   
Although both trait and ability measures address understanding, regulating 
and managing emotions, they are distinct and should not be used interchangeably 
(Petrides & Furnham, 2001) as their relationships with outcomes differ in strength 
(Brackett & Mayer, 2003). Trait emotional intelligence describes typical behaviour, 
and is assessed by self-report measures (Petrides & Furnham, 2000).  Like ability 
models, trait models comprise intrapersonal and interpersonal components, but also 
facets measuring emotional adaptability and general mood.  Trait measures have 
been criticised as overlapping with measures of related traits and constructs such as 
optimism and happiness (Petrides et al., 2007).  However they have the advantage of 
capturing the subjectivity of emotional experiences, and are less complex to score 
than ability measures (Petrides et al., 2007). Further, ability tests have been critiqued 
based on concerns with construct validity (e.g. Maul, 2012; Schlegel, 2016) and a 
reliance on expert and consensus based scoring (e.g. Brackett, Rivers, & Salovey, 
2011). For those reasons, this study is concerned only with trait emotional 
intelligence.   
Emotional Intelligence: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly   
 The suggestion that emotional intelligence leads to better wellbeing (Mayer 
and Salovey, 1990) is evident in its association with positive outcomes and success 
(Petrides, Pérez-González, & Furnham, 2007). Martins, Ramalho, and Morin (2010) 
examined the relationship between emotional intelligence and health in a meta-
analysis of 67 studies.  Emotional intelligence showed an overall positive moderate-
sized relationship with physical, psychosomatic, and mental health. A more recent 
review (Petrides et al., 2016) confirmed the advantages of high emotional 
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intelligence in regards to psychological and physical health. This implies that being 
adept at recognising and controlling emotions relates to better wellbeing. 
High emotional intelligence also benefits others (Smith, Heaven, & Ciarrochi, 
2008). Smith et al. found that emotional intelligence positively predicted relationship 
satisfaction.  This finding was also noted by Malouff, Schutte, and Thorsteinsson 
(2014), whose meta-analysis indicated a moderate-sized positive relationship 
between trait emotional intelligence and romantic relationship satisfaction.  The 
interpersonal benefit of emotional intelligence has also been demonstrated in the 
workplace (Petrides et al., 2016; Schutte & Loi, 2014).  From a trait perspective, the 
interpersonal benefits of emotional intelligence are seen through its positive 
associations with agreeableness (Saklofske, Austin, & Minski, 2003) and 
conscientiousness (Austin et al., 2007), as those traits reflect being helpful, 
dependable and trustworthy (Lee & Ashton, 2004).  Those relationships with positive 
traits and interpersonal outcomes suggest that Emotional Intelligence is pro-social, as 
benefits people with whom you interact.  
The potential for emotional intelligence to be used maliciously was originally 
identified by Salovey and Mayer (1990).  However, it is only more recently that the 
self-serving aspect of emotional intelligence has been studied (Austin et al., 2007), 
specifically by investigating whether individuals use emotional skills to benefit 
themselves (e.g. Austin, Saklofske, Smith, & Tohver 2014; Grieve & Mahar, 2010;).   
This “dark” side of emotional intelligence is termed emotional manipulation, and has 
been studied using the relationship between emotional intelligence and 
Machiavellianism. 
The concept of a Machiavellian personality stems from the political style and 
writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, who was renowned for his use of duplicitous means 
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to gain power (Christie & Geis, 1970).  Machiavellian behaviour is characterised by 
deceptive and manipulative behaviours (Christie & Geis, 1970), and by a lack of 
moral regard (Paulhus & Williams, 2002).  Individual differences in 
Machiavellianism have been studied from the perspective of personality, with 
moderate negative relationships found between Machiavellianism and both 
agreeableness and conscientiousness (Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006; Paulhus & Williams, 
2002).  Thus, conceptually, people with manipulative tendencies are less likely to 
possess pro-social traits, as they are less good-natured and less reliable. 
If being pro-social decreases manipulative behaviours, a negative relationship 
would be expected between Machiavellianism and emotional intelligence, as like 
agreeableness, emotional intelligence is pro-social.  Austin et al. (2007) found a 
moderate negative relationship between emotional intelligence and 
Machiavellianism, which has since been substantiated (Ali, Amorim, & Chamorro-
Premuzic, 2009; O’Connor & Athota, 2013). Notably, the relationship found 
between emotional intelligence and Machiavellianism was stronger when emotional 
intelligence was measured using items relating to managing others’ emotions (Austin 
et al., 2007).  Although the negative direction of those relationships is not directly 
suggestive of a malicious use of pro-social abilities, it highlights the importance of 
the emotional management of others within those relationships. 
Managing others’ emotions for self-benefit is only one aspect of 
Machiavellianism.  For that reason, Austin et al. (2007) developed the Emotional 
Manipulation Scale in order to eliminate capturing variance unrelated to emotional 
manipulation.  Emotional manipulation and Machiavellianism shared 16% of 
variance, suggesting that they are separate constructs despite sharing features (Austin 
et al., 2007).  However, the “dark” side of emotional intelligence was still not 
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evident, as emotional intelligence and emotional manipulation were unrelated. 
Although the interpersonal aspect of emotional intelligence, and emotional 
manipulation involve managing others’ emotions, the key difference is that 
emotional intelligence is pro-social.  It could thus be argued that the lack of 
relationship is due to the pro-social nature of interpersonal emotional intelligence.  
Thus, accounting for pro-social characteristics in the emotional intelligence 
and emotional manipulation relationship by examining the influence of other 
predictors could result in demonstrating the use of positive emotional skills for 
darker purposes. As understanding the influence of additional predicting factors 
together is beyond the scope of a bivariate correlational analysis, using an analysis 
that allows multiple predictors of a behaviour is appropriate.  That approach is also 
more ecologically valid, as factors that predict behaviour do not exist in isolation.  
Predictors of Emotional Manipulation 
 Although emotional intelligence has no bivariate relationship with emotional 
manipulation (Austin et al., 2007; Hyde & Grieve, 2014), it positively predicts 
emotional manipulation when together with other related variables due to suppressor 
effects (Grieve & Mahar, 2010).  A suppressor variable shows no bivariate 
relationship with an outcome variable, however its predictive validity improves when 
a related variable is present (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000). Emotional 
intelligence and ethical reasoning together positively predicted emotional 
manipulation, when no relationship between emotional intelligence and emotional 
manipulation was found (Grieve and Mahar, 2010).  As previously suggested, 
agreeableness and conscientiousness are pro-social, thus could explain why people 
use their emotions to help others as they are positively related (Austin et al., 2007).  
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Specifically, emotional intelligence, agreeableness, and conscientiousness could 
predict emotional manipulation.   
 O’Connor and Athota (2013) found that emotional intelligence and 
agreeableness positively predicted Machiavellianism, however they did not test that 
relationship using emotional manipulation. Grieve (2011) investigated the role of 
personality in predicting emotional manipulation.  Self-monitoring, which is 
normally associated with emotional intelligence (Petrides, Pérez-González, & 
Furnham, 2007), positively predicted emotional manipulation, while agreeableness 
and conscientiousness negatively predicted emotional manipulation.  This suggests 
that high self-monitoring, low agreeableness, and low conscientiousness increase the 
likelihood of emotional manipulation.  However, the role of emotional intelligence 
was not considered by Grieve in that study.  Given the positive relationship between 
self-monitoring and emotional intelligence, it could be argued that agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, and emotional intelligence could positively predict emotional 
manipulation.  The current study aimed to investigate the combined contributions of 
those factors to emotional manipulation.  
Mood and Helping Behaviours 
Although personality is stable and enduring and predicts behaviour, 
behaviour varies across situations.  This suggests that situational variables also 
predict behaviour (Fleeson, 2001).  Mood states vary within an individual and are 
comparable to a situational variable (Scherer, 2005).  A mood is a low intensity but 
pervasive subjective feeling that unlike emotions, does not always have an 
identifiable cause (Scherer, 2005).  Rather, moods are a more general feeling that 
often lasts longer than an emotion (Beedie, Terry, & Lane, 2005).  Although to date, 
no study has examined the effect of mood on anti-social or self-serving behaviour 
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such as emotional manipulation, studies have examined the effect of mood on pro-
social behaviour.  
The effect of mood on helping has been attributed to priming (Carlson et al., 
1988).   Network models of memory are cognitive paradigms that assume that 
memory is a network consisting of interconnected nodes, where nodes represent 
concepts.  Nodes accumulate activation when a related stimulus is encountered. Once 
the activation level reaches a node’s threshold, the node fires and activation spreads 
to other conceptually related nodes which can in turn cause related nodes to fire 
(Collins & Loftus, 1975).  In those networks nodes are words, however nodes can 
also relate to mood states (Forgas, 2001). A node representing a mood would activate 
a node that represents a mood congruent behaviour.  According to the Affect 
Infusion Model (Forgas, 1995), a positive mood facilitates pro-social behaviour, 
while a negative mood promotes defensive interpersonal behaviours.   
Forgas et al. (2008) studied the effect of mood on helping behaviour.  
Employees were given positive or negative feedback to induce a positive or negative 
mood respectively. Helping was measured by the number of positive responses 
during discussions with customers.  In less experienced assistants, helping behaviour 
was higher in the positive feedback condition, than in the neutral and negative 
feedback conditions.  No effect of mood was found in the experienced group. The 
Affect Infusion Model (Forgas, 1995) proposes that the effect of mood lessens with 
experience in the relevant task.    Although the concept of affective priming has been 
applied to pro-social behaviour, it has not been applied to self-serving behaviour, 
specifically to emotional manipulation.    
Mood and Emotional Manipulation 
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According to affective priming (Forgas, 2001), a positive mood increases the 
likelihood of helping another.  If this is the case, then a positive mood might 
decrease the likelihood of using emotional manipulation as you want to others, rather 
than helping oneself through malicious means.   If a negative mood decreases 
helping behaviour because the need to help yourself is seen as more important than 
helping others, then a negative mood could increase self-serving tendencies, making 
it more likely that you help yourself through malicious means.  The current study 
aims to investigate the effect of mood on emotionally manipulative tendencies for the 
first time.    
The Present Study  
Emotional manipulation negatively impacts the targets of this behaviour in 
workplace settings (Hyde, Grieve, & Scott, 2016).  Linton and Power (2013) found 
that 38% of participants reported being bullied in their workplace once every week in 
the period up to 6 months prior to the study. Workplace harassment resulted in 2070 
mental stress workers’ compensation claims in 2011-12 (Safe Work Australia, 2015), 
which is suggestive of the negative psychological impact that emotional 
manipulation has on others.  Hyde et al. found that being a perceived target of 
emotional manipulation is associated with higher reported levels of stress, anxiety 
and depression. Identifying the conditions under which individuals use positive 
emotional abilities with malicious intent, could result in interventions that encourage 
people to use their emotional skills in less harmful ways.   
Unpacking emotional manipulation. 
There are several ways that emotional manipulation can be assessed. The 
Emotional Manipulation Scale (Austin et al., 2007) assesses the perceived ability to 
engage in emotionally manipulative behaviours, however other measures have been 
!!
10!
developed from a different approach.  Hyde and Grieve (2014) extended the 
Emotional Manipulation scale (Austin et al., 2007) by modifying items to measure 
how often people use emotional manipulation.  That scale captures an individual’s 
willingness to engage in emotional manipulation rather than their perceived ability to 
do so, as a person’s reported ability to manipulate was urelated to their willingness to 
manipulate (Hyde and Grieve, 2014).  
The Managing the Emotions of Others Scale (MEOS; Austin & O’Donnell, 
2013) includes subscales that measure the use of specific emotional manipulation 
tactics.  The mood-worsening subscale involves using anger and criticism to worsen 
others’ moods.  This strategy is self-serving as it could be used in a vengeful manner. 
The Inauthentic Strategy subscale measures the use of strategies such as sulking, 
flattery or inducing guilt for self-gain. Both subscales showed strong positive 
associations with Machiavellianism (Austin & O’Donnell, 2013), which were 
stronger than found between emotional manipulation and Machiavellianism (Austin 
et al., 2007).  Agreeableness and conscientiousness were both more strongly related 
to mood-worsening and inauthentic strategy (Austin and O’Donnell, 2013), than they 
were with emotional manipulation ability (Austin et al., 2007).  This suggests that the 
self-serving subscales of the MEOS (Austin & O’Donnell, 2013) are more specific 
measures than a measure of emotional manipulation.  
 For completeness, the current study therefore operationalised emotional 
manipulation in four ways, using the Emotional Manipulation Ability Scale (Hyde & 
Grieve, 2014), the Emotional Manipulation Willingness Scale (Hyde & Grieve, 
2014), and the Mood-worsening and Inauthentic Strategy subscales of the MEOS 
(Austin & O’Donnell, 2013). This broad approach to assessing emotional 
manipulation was a novel one. 
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Aims and hypotheses. 
The present study aimed to investigate the influence of emotional 
intelligence, agreeableness and conscientiousness on emotional manipulation. It was 
hypothesised that emotional intelligence, agreeableness, and conscientiousness 
would predict emotional manipulation.  It was also predicted that more variance 
would be explained when measuring emotional manipulation with the MEOS 
subscales (Austin & O’Donnell, 2013) compared to the Emotional Manipulation 
Ability Scale (Hyde & Grieve, 2016), as the MEOS subscales are more specific 
measures.  
Specifically, within the models, it was hypothesised that emotional 
intelligence would be positively related to emotional manipulation, and both 
agreeableness and conscientiousness would show negative relationships with 
emotional manipulation.  
 In addition to the contribution of emotional intelligence, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness to emotional manipulation, the present study aimed to investigate 
the effect of positive and negative moods following a mood induction procedure.   
Forgas et al (2008) found higher helping from positive than negative moods.  This 
effect was explained through affective priming (Forgas, 2001).  Conceptually, an 
increase in pro-social behaviour could decrease self-serving behaviour through 
helping others rather than yourself.  Forgas also suggested that a negative mood 
primes defensive interpersonal behaviours, as you choose to help yourself, thus a 
negative mood could prime self-serving behaviour. It was therefore hypothesised that 
mood would significantly contribute to emotional manipulation on top of any 
influence of emotional intelligence, agreeableness, and conscientiousness.  
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 Further, it was hypothesised that a positive mood would negatively predict 
emotional manipulation, and that a negative mood would positively predict 
emotional manipulation.  All hypotheses were tested while controlling for gender, as 
gender differences have been shown to account for a significant proportion of 
variance in emotional manipulation, with males scoring higher than females (e.g. 
Grieve, 2011; Hyde & Grieve, 2014).   
Method 
Participants 
 The sample comprised 155 (28 males and 127 females) undergraduate 
psychology students who were invited to contribute their data for the purpose of this 
study.  The mean age was 23.5 years (SD = 8.36, range 18 - 43).  The majority of 
participants were Caucasian (87.74%), then Asian (5.81%), Aboriginal (1.29%), 
African American (0.65%), Pacific Islander (0.65%), and Hispanic (0.65%), and 
3.23% reporting as ‘Other’. Most participants (n = 141) reported English as their first 
language.   
Design and Analysis  
A correlational design with an experimental longitudinal component was 
used. Two sets of analyses addressed the hypotheses. At Time 1, predictor variables 
were emotional intelligence, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, with emotional 
manipulation as the outcome variable (emotional manipulation ability, emotional 
manipulation willingness, mood-worsening strategy, inauthenticity strategy). To test 
the effect of mood, mood was experimentally manipulated between-groups at Time 
2, with three levels (happy, neutral and sad).  The emotional manipulation measures 
were re-administered.  
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All hypotheses were tested with hierarchical multiple regression analyses. A 
hierarchical multiple regression analysis allows examination of how multiple 
variables predict an outcome variable.  Predictor variables are entered progressively, 
allowing the estimation of variance that each step adds over and above previously 
entered predictors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).   
As mood was a categorical variable with more than two levels, dummy 
variables were created in order to examine the effect of mood on the outcome 
variables within the regression analysis.  A dummy variable is a linear representation 
of the difference between the level of the variable of interest and all other levels of 
that variable (Field, 2013).  The number of dummy variables that can be created from 
a categorical predictor variable is g – 1, where g = the number of levels (Cohen, 
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2013). 
Control variables.  Gender differences in emotional manipulation have been 
noted previously with males scoring higher than females (Grieve, 2011; Hyde & 
Grieve, 2014).  Differences in emotional manipulation between males and females 
were accounted for by entering gender as a control variable.  Time 1 emotional 
manipulation scores were also controlled for in the Time 2 regressions, to account for 
individual differences in emotional manipulation. 
A priori power analysis.  The number of participants needed for a multiple 
regression analysis is 104 + k (k = the number of predictor variables; Green, 1991).  
As the present study included four predictor variables for the Time 1 analysis 
(gender, emotional intelligence, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness) with three 
additional predictors for Time 2 (Time 1 emotional manipulation and, and the two 
dummy coded mood variables) the number of participants needed to detect a 
medium-sized effect was 111.  The calculation is based on finding a medium sized 
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effect of f 2 = .15, where alpha = .05 and power = .8 (Cohen, 1992).  The number of 
participants who took part in the current study exceeded the number required.  
Materials 
Copies of all measures and the mood induction stimuli are included in 
Appendices A1-A11.  
Demographic information. Participant information requested included age, 
native language, and gender.   
 Emotional intelligence.  Emotional intelligence was measured by the Self-
Report Emotional Intelligence Scale (SREIS; Schutte et al., 1998).  This 33-item 
scale is based on the model of emotional intelligence proposed by Salovey and 
Mayer (1997), and assesses an individual’s perceived ability to recognise, analyse, 
and manage emotions in them self and in others.  Participants rate their level of 
agreement with statements on a 5-point scale ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 
5=strongly agree.  Items include “I am aware of my emotions as I experience them”, 
and “I help other people feel better when they are down”.  Some items are reverse 
scored, so that high scores represent high emotional intelligence.  The scale 
demonstrates good construct validity through its relationship with alexithymia 
(Grieve & Mahar, 2010). The scale has excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s α 
= .91) (Grieve & Mahar, 2010), and good test-retest reliability (r=.78) (Schutte et al., 
1998). 
Agreeableness and conscientiousness.  Agreeableness and 
conscientiousness were measured using the relevant subscales of the HEXACO-60 
(Ashton & Lee, 2009).  In each subscale, participants report their agreement with 10 
statements such as “I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree 
with me” (agreeableness) and “I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the 
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expense of time” (conscientiousness)” on a 5-point scale (1=strongly disagree, 
5=strongly agree).  Some items are reverse scored, so that higher overall scores 
represent greater levels of the construct. Reliability for both subscales is good (α = 
.77 and .78 for agreeableness and conscientiousness respectively).  The scales show 
good concurrent validity, through their moderate positive association (r = .57 and 
.75) with the relevant subscales of a measure of the Big Five (Ashton & Lee, 2009),  
Emotional manipulation. 
Emotional manipulation ability.  The Emotional Manipulation Ability Scale 
(Hyde & Grieve, 2014) consists of 10 items from the emotional manipulation factor 
of Austin et al.’s (2007) measure.  Items assess participants’ perceived ability to 
evoke emotions in others for self-interest.  A sample item is “I know how to make 
another person feel uneasy”. Responses are made on a 5-point scale ranging from 
1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree.  High scores represent high levels of 
emotional manipulation. The scale shows good construct validity, which is 
demonstrated by its relationship with Machiavellianism.  (Austin et al., 2007)   The 
subscale’s internal consistency is excellent (α =.93) (Grieve & Panebianco, 2013). 
Emotional manipulation willingness.  The Emotional Manipulation Willingness 
scale (Hyde & Grieve, 2014) consists of 10 items that assess the level of willingness 
to use emotional skills maliciously.  Participants indicate how often they employ 
manipulative tactics, where 1 = Never, 2= Now and then, 3 = Monthly, 4= Weekly, 
and 5 = Daily, for example “How often do you use your emotional abilities to make 
another person feel uneasy?”  The scale has good construct validity demonstrated 
through its moderate positive relationship (r=.36) with primary psychopathy, as 
individuals with high levels of primary psychopathy have a propensity to manipulate 
others (Neumann & Hare, 2008).  Internal consistency reliability is very good (α 
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=.81) (Hyde & Grieve, 2014). 
Emotional manipulation strategies: Mood-worsening and inauthenticity.   
The Mood-worsening and inauthenticity subscales of the MEOS (Austin & 
O’Donnell, 2013) Were used. Thirteen items describe the ability to worsen mood by 
evoking negative emotions in others such as shame or anxiety, with the aim of 
manipulating their behaviour, such as “I know how to embarrass someone to stop 
them from behaving in a particular way”. Eleven items assess the use of inauthentic 
strategies such as sulking or flattery to manipulate others, for example “I am 
especially nice to people whose friendship is advantageous to me”. Responses are 
made on a 5-point scale with anchors 1 =strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree.  
High scores represent a high use of emotional manipulation strategies.  The subscales 
show good construct validity (Austin & O’Connell, 2013).  Internal reliability has 
been shown to be excellent for mood-worsening (α =.91, and α =.83) and 
inauthenticity (α =.83 and α=.85) across two samples (Austin et al., 2014). 
Autobiographical mood induction.  
The mood induction was based on an existing autobiographical Mood 
Induction procedure (Baker & Guttfreund,1993). Participants are asked to think for 
two minutes about two happy, sad, or neutral events that occurred in their past, then 
to write about the events for five minutes.   
Mood induction check.    
Participants completed The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) 
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Ten positive words such as “excited” and 
“proud” comprise the positive affect subscale, and 10 negative words such as 
“irritable” and “jittery” make up the negative affect subscale.  Participants indicate 
the extent to which they relate to each word on a scale ranging between 1 and 5, 
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where 1=very slightly or not at all and 5=extremely. Higher scores indicate stronger 
affect.  Both the positive affect subscale (α=.89) and the negative affect subscale 
(α=.85) have very good internal consistency (Crawford & Henry, 2004).  Construct 
validity of both subscales is demonstrated through relationships with depression, 
with depression negatively related to the positive subscale (r = -.48), and positively 
related to the negative subscale (r = .60).  
Two bi-polar visual analogue scales with endpoints reflecting happy and sad 
mood were included as a secondary mood check.  The labels of one scale used faces 
while the other scale used word labels.  Participants mark the point on a line that 
indicates their current mood state.  Horizontal lines were used as they are less prone 
to error than vertical lines (Dixon & Bird, 1981).   Visual analogue scales using both 
faces and words to communicate mood labels have demonstrated excellent construct 
validity through strong relationships with measures of dysphoric mood (r = .81) 
(Stern & Bachman, 1991).  Low scores represent a happy mood, while high scores 
represent a sad mood. 
Procedure 
 Ethics approval was granted by the University of Tasmania’s Human 
Research Ethics Committee (Reference number H0015713) (See Appendix B for 
approval letter).  Data was collected at two time points.  At Time 1, measures were 
completed online, while at Time 2 paper questionnaires were completed during a 
practical class activity. Participants completed the online questionnaire before 
attending the practical class.  Due to timetabling differences, the interval between 
Time 1 and Time 2 ranged between 1 and 4 days. 
 Time 1.  Students were invited to follow a link to the online survey hosted on 
SurveyMonkey.   Participants read the information sheet (see Appendix C) before 
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voluntarily consenting to the use of their data for research purposes.  Time 1 
measures were emotional intelligence, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and 
emotional manipulation.  Data were collected on religion, ethnicity, political 
orientation and disgust sensitivity, to be used as part of an unrelated study. 
All scales were presented in the same order.  At completion, participants constructed 
a unique identifier code so that Time 1 and Time 2 data could be matched, while 
remaining non-identifiable.   
 Time 2.  Time 2 tasks were incorporated during a class activity as part of the 
emotion and cognition component of the unit.  Limited information was disclosed 
about the mood induction to control for demand characteristics (Orne, 1962). 
Students and class instructors were blind to participants’ assigned mood group. 
 Following the mood induction, participants completed the measures of 
emotional manipulation and the mood manipulation checks.  Participants were then 
debriefed as part of in-class discussion.   To reverse any residual sad mood, 
participants listened to a song (“Wake up Boo” by the Boo Radleys, in line with 
Grieve & Padgett, 2016). Students were advised to take their autobiographical 
paragraphs with them after the class, to maintain confidentiality and asked not to 
disclose the details of the activity to those who had not yet attended their own 
practical class. 
Results  
Data Screening 
There was a small amount of missing data, thus missing data points were 
estimated using the average of remaining scale items relative to the participant (per 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Boxplots revealed one multivariate outlier, which was 
confirmed as extreme as the relevant scales’ standardised residuals were above the 
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3.29 limit recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2012).  Inspection of responses 
for that case suggested that the participant was consistently endorsing the far lower 
end of the response options, indicating a response bias (Christensen, 2004), thus, that 
participant’s data was removed from the dataset.  Casewise diagnostics identified 
another consistent outlier (in one Time 1 regression and across three of the four Time 
2 regressions).  The analyses were run excluding the outlier, and as it was found not 
to be an influential case, it was retained for analysis.  
Assumption Testing  
Assumptions were tested on all overall variables at Time 1.  Due to the effect 
of mood on scores at Time 2, assumptions were examined on overall Time 2 
variables, as well as on those variables as a function of mood where appropriate. 
Normality.  Histograms of Time 1 data indicated possible floor effects for 
mood-worsening and emotional manipulation willingness. This was confirmed by the 
standardised skew statistics (S/SES) for mood-worsening (4.16 = p < .001) and 
emotional manipulation willingness (7.39 = p < .001) indicating significant 
skewness.  Emotional intelligence showed a mild negative skew (-2.11 = p < .05).  
Kurtosis statistics indicated that emotional intelligence was mildly leptokurtic (2.44 
= p < .05) and willingness was highly leptokurtic (7.25 = p <.001).  A natural log 
transformation of emotional manipulation willingness was undertaken, however the 
log of the variable was still significantly skewed. As analyses based on the F 
distribution are robust to violations of the assumption of normality (Glass, Peckham, 
& Sanders, 1972) the non-transformed variable was used.  Inspection of probability 
plots in the regression model suggested bivariate normality in all variables, except 
for emotional manipulation willingness. 
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The histograms of Time 2 variables by mood conditions suggested a positive 
skew in emotional manipulation willingness across all moods. Skew statistics 
confirmed the positive skew across all variables, as all z scores were greater than 
1.96.  A mild negative skew was noted in the neutral emotional manipulation 
willingness group, (-2.88=p<.05).  Normality plots within the regression indicated 
normally distributed errors, except for emotional manipulation willingness that was 
positively skewed. 
Linearity.  Screening of bivariate scatterplots indicated linear relationships, 
as no curvilinear patterns were observed. 
Homoscedasticity.  The standardised residuals and predicted values plots 
showed an even distribution of data-points around zero, for all variables except 
emotional manipulation willingness.  The distribution of data-points was suggestive 
of heteroscedasticity as the data-points were more noticeably more tightly clustered 
at the negative end of the predicted values. 
Multicollinearity.  All bivariate correlations between predictor variables 
were below .8, which indicated a lack of multicollinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2012).  This was confirmed as the variance inflation factors (VIF) were below 10 and 
the Tolerance levels were greater than 0.1 as recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2012).  
Independence of errors.  The Durbin-Watson statistics suggested an absence 
of autocorrelation as all ds at Time 1(1.77, 1.75, 2.02 and 1.91) and at Time 2 (1.93, 
2.19, 1.98, and 1.98) were between the recommended values of 1 and 3.   
Preliminary Analyses 
 Check for systematic differences in Time 1 variables.  Although 
participants were randomly allocated to mood groups, for completeness, one-way 
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ANOVAs were conducted to test for pre-existing differences in Time 1 variables.  A 
Bonferroni adjustment was applied to allow for the family-wise error rate (α = .05/7 
= .007).  Full results of the ANOVAs are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Internal Reliabilities of Scores at Time 1 
Variable α M SD 95% CI 
Emotional intelligence .89 117.10 13.78 [114.91, 119.30] 
Agreeableness .71 31.81 5.59 [30.92, 32.69] 
Conscientiousness .76 34.80 5.79 [33.88, 35.72] 
EM ability .93 25.30 9.27 [23.82, 26.77] 
EM willingness .80 15.84 4.44 [15.13, 16.54] 
Mood-worsening .93 23.69 9.27 [22.22, 25.17] 
Inauthenticity strategy .88 28.96 7.85 [27.71, 30.21] 
Note. CI = confidence interval; EM ability = emotional manipulation ability; EM 
willingness = emotional manipulation willingness. 
 
Although the ANOVAs were not statistically significant, emotional 
manipulation ability, and mood-worsening showed small-sized effects (Cohen, 
1992).  The effect sizes of differences between mean scores were examined using 
Cohen’s d. Bonferroni adjusted post hoc multiple comparisons (α = .05) showed that 
participants in the happy group reported significantly less emotional manipulation 
ability than the neutral group, Mdiff = -4.47, SE = 1.77, p = .038, d = 0.49, which was 
a medium-sized effect.  Participants in the happy group also reported less emotional 
manipulation ability than those in the sad group. This was not significant, Mdiff = -
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4.10, SE = 1.79, p = .070, d = 0.46, but showed a medium-sized effect. There was no 
difference between the neutral and sad groups, Mdiff = 0.37, SE = 1.84, p = 1.00, d = 
0.06.  Participants in the happy group also reported less mood-worsening strategies 
that those in the sad group, Mdiff = -4.66, SE = 1.79, p = .030, d = 0.54 and neutral 
group Mdiff = -3.88, SE = 1.70, p = .090, d = 0.43.  There was no difference between 
the neutral and sad groups, Mdiff = -0.79, SE = 1.84, p = 1.000, d = 0.08. Thus, 
although participants were randomly allocated to mood conditions at Time 2, some 
pre-existing differences were evident. 
 Gender differences.  A series of Bonferroni adjusted t-tests (α =.05/7= .007) 
assessed differences as a function of gender (see Table 2 for complete details).  
Males scored significantly higher than females on mood-worsening, this was 
medium effect. Although no other comparisons reached significance, the differences 
in males and females on emotional manipulation ability produced a medium-sized 
effect, and emotional manipulation willingness and conscientiousness resulted in 
small-sized effects. Thus, the decision to include gender as a control variable was 
prudent. 
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Table 2 
Means and Mean Differences on all Scores According to Gender 
 Males (n = 27)  Females (n = 127)       
 M SD  M SD t df p Mdiff 95% CI d 
Emotional intelligence 118.70 14.99  116.76 (13.55) 0.66 152 .508 1.94 [-3.84, 7.72] 0.12 
Agreeableness 32.26 6.00  31.70 (5.52) 0.46 152 .643 0.55 [-1.79, 2.90] 0.10 
Conscientiousness 33.11 5.63  35.16 (5.79) -1.68 152 .096 -2.05 [-4.45, 0.37] 0.35 
EM ability 28.37 9.41  24.65 (9.14) 1.91 152 .058 3.72 [-0.12, 7.57] 0.40 
EM willingness 16.74 4.90  15.65 (4.33) 1.66 152 .246 1.10 [-0.76, 2.95] 0.25 
Mood-worsening 28.26 10.72  22.72 (8.68) 2.88 152 .005 5.53 [1.74, 9.33] 0.61 
Inauthenticity strategy 28.63 6.71  29.03 (8.09) -0.24 152 .810 -0.40 [-3.70, 2.89] 0.05 
Note. CI = confidence interval; EM ability = emotional manipulation ability; EM willingness = emotional manipulation willingness. 
 α =.007 (.05/7) to control the family-wise error rate.   
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Mood Induction Check  
A series of one-way ANOVAs was conducted on the positive and negative 
PANAS scales, and on both visual analogue scales.  Ryan-Einot-Welsch post hoc 
tests (α =.05) examined differences in scores between mood conditions. (See Table 3 
for means). 
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Table 3 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Mood Measures According to Mood Group 
 
 
 Happy (n = 56)  Neutral (n = 50)  Sad (n = 48) 
Variable M SD 95% CI    M SD 95% CI  M SD 95% CI 
Positive PANAS 25.02 7.84 [22.73, 27.08]   24.62 6.67 [22.72, 26.51]   20.90 7.00 [18.86, 22.93] 
Negative PANAS 14.84 6.91 [13.09, 16.92]  15.24 4.99 [13.82, 16.66]  17.15 6.43 [15.28, 19.01] 
Face VAS 51.75 30.70 [44.29,61.11]  51.88 25.95 [44.51, 59.25]  72.44 29.79 [63.79, 81.09] 
Word VAS 47.11 30.66 [38.74, 55.48]  50.90 27.09 [43.20, 58.59]  73.96 32.33 [64.57, 83.35] 
 
Note.  CI = confidence interval; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Scale; VAS = visual analogue scale. 
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 There was a significant difference on the positive PANAS scores, F(2, 151) = 
4.95, p=.008.  Scores in the sad group were lower than the happy, d = 0.55 and the 
neutral groups, d = 0.55, while the happy and neutral groups did not differ, d = 0.05.  
There were no differences in negative PANAS scores, F(2, 151)=1.99, p=.14.  The 
difference between the happy and sad groups showed a small-sized effect, d = .34, 
between the neutral and sad groups showed a small-sized effect d =0.33, while the 
difference between the happy and neutral groups was trivial. 
There was a difference between groups on the face VAS scores, F(2, 151) = 
8.37, p < .001.   The happy and neutral groups’ scores were significantly lower than 
the sad group, ds = 0.68 and 0.73 respectively which represent medium effect sizes.  
However, the happy and neutral groups scores did not differ, d = 0.01. 
There was also a difference in the word VAS scale scores, F(1,149) = 11.56, 
p < .001. The happy group and neutral group scores were significantly lower than the 
sad group, ds = 0.85 and 0.77 respectively, which represent large effect sizes.  
However, the happy and neutral groups scores did not differ, d = 0.13.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 Means, standard deviations and internal reliabilities (Cronbach’s α) of 
variables measured at Times 1 and 2 are presented in Tables 4 and 5 respectively.  
Participants reported similar levels of agreeableness and conscientiousness as 
reported by Grieve (2011).  Inauthentic strategy, emotional manipulation ability and 
emotional intelligence were also comparable to existing research, though emotional 
manipulation willingness and mood-worsening means were both slightly lower than 
those reported previously (Austin et al., 2014; Hyde & Grieve, 2014; O’Connor & 
Athota, 2013). 
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Table 4 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Internal Consistency Reliabilities of Scores at Time 1 as a Function of Mood 
 Happy (n = 56)  Neutral (n = 50)  Sad (n = 48) 
Variable M SD 95%CI    M SD 95%CI  M SD 95%CI 
Emotional intelligence 118.77 13.49 [115.16,122.38]   116.62 13.88 [112.67,120.56]   115.67 14.10 [111.57,119.76] 
Agreeableness 32.64 5.24 [31.24, 34.05]  31.34 5.45 [29.79, 32.89]  31.31 6.09 [29.54, 33.08] 
Conscientiousness 35.15 6.09 [33.51, 36.77]  34.42 5.90 [32.74, 36.10]  34.79 5.41 [33.22, 36.36] 
EM ability 22.57 8.99 [20.16, 24.98]  27.04 9.29 [24.40, 29.68]  26.67 9.00 [24.05, 29.28] 
EM willingness 15.50 4.64 [14.26, 16.74]  16.34 4.61 [15.03, 17.65]  15.71 4.06 [14.53, 16.89] 
Mood-worsening 20.98 8.09 [18.82, 23.15]  24.86 9.85 [22.06, 27.66]  25.64 9.39 [22.92, 28.37] 
Inauthenticity strategy 28.14 8.79 [25.79, 30.49]  29.58 6.91 [27.62, 31.54]  29.27 7.69 [27.03, 31.50] 
Note. CI = confidence interval; EM ability = emotional manipulation ability; EM willingness = emotional manipulation willingness. 
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Table 5 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Internal Consistency Reliabilities of Scores at Time 2 as a Function of Mood 
 Happy (n = 56)  Neutral (n = 50)  Sad (n = 48) 
Variable M SD 95%CI    M SD 95%CI  M SD 95%CI 
EM ability 25.11 8.95 [22.71, 27.50]  29.48 9.29 [27.52, 31.44]  29.08 7.57 [26.89, 31.28] 
EM willingness 16.02 4.13 [14.91, 17.12]  17.60 4.96 [16.19, 19.01]  17.17 4.44 [15.88, 18.46] 
Mood-worsening 24.25 9.22 [21.78, 26.72]  28.54 8.15 [26.22, 30.86]  27.85 9.39 [25.13, 30.58] 
Inauthenticity 25.77 8.13 [23.58, 27.94]  29.08 7.50 [26.95, 31.21]  28.20 8.38 [25.77, 30.64] 
Note. CI = confidence interval; EM ability = emotional manipulation ability; EM willingness = emotional manipulation willingness. 
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 Internal consistency reliabilities (Cronbach’s α) of emotional intelligence, 
emotional manipulation ability, inauthentic strategy and mood-worsening at Time 1 
were very good (Cronbach, 1951), and comparable to previous findings (O’Connor 
& Athota, 2013; Grieve & Mahar, 2010; Grieve, 2001; Austin & O’Donnell, 2013; 
Austin et al., 2014). Conscientiousness and emotional manipulation willingness both 
showed good internal consistency, aligning with findings by Ashton and Lee (2009) 
and Grieve respectively (2011).  The internal reliability of the Agreeableness 
subscale was good but lower than reported by Grieve (2011). 
 Bivariate correlations.  The correlation matrix is presented in Table 5. 
Emotional Intelligence showed no bivariate relationship with emotional manipulation 
ability or willingness in line with Hyde and Grieve (2014).  It was also not related to 
inauthentic strategy or mood-worsening; findings that were inconsistent with 
previous research reporting weak negative associations (Austin et al., 2014; 
O’Connor & Athota, 2013). All measures of emotional manipulation showed 
moderate and strong relationships with each other.   
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Table 6 
Bivariate Correlations of all Variables Measured at Time 1 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Emotional intelligence -       
2. Agreeableness    .22* -      
3. Conscientiousness    .24* -.03 -     
4. EM ability .08      -.34**     -.21* -    
5. EM willingness -.05      -.36** -.11 .63** -   
6. Mood-worsening -.16      -.48**     -.21* .66** .66** -  
7. Inauthenticity strategy -.02      -.35** -.04 .47** .57** .47** - 
Note. EM Ability = emotional manipulation ability; EM Willingness = emotional manipulation willingness. 
 *p < .01, **p < .001. 
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Inferential Statistics: Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Emotional 
Intelligence as Predictors of Emotional Manipulation 
 All effect sizes are interpreted in line with Cohen (1992). Tables 7, 8, 9, and 
10 contain the results of the two step hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
predicting emotional manipulation ability, willingness, mood-worsening and 
inauthenticity strategies respectively. 
 Emotional manipulation ability. In step one, gender accounted for 1.7% of 
variance of emotional manipulation ability. This was significant amount, R = .15, 
adjusted R2 = .071, F(1,152) = 3.66, p = .058, and showed a small effect f2 =0 .02. 
 Including agreeableness, conscientiousness and emotional intelligence in the 
second step explained an additional 19.8% of variance, adjusted !R2 = .20,  F! =  (3, 
149) = 12.67, p < .001, which was a significant improvement.  The model, explained 
22.2% of variance, R = .47, adjusted R2 = .20, F(4,149) = 10.63, p < .001,  f2 = 0.28, 
suggesting a large-sized effect.  Within the model, being more emotionally 
intelligent, and less agreeable and less conscientious predicted emotional 
manipulation ability. 
Emotional manipulation willingness. Gender accounted for a non-
significant 0.9% of variance of emotional manipulation willingness, R = .09, adjusted 
R2 = .002, F(1, 152) = 1.36, p = .246, f2 =0 .01, a small effect.  The addition of 
agreeableness, conscientiousness and emotional intelligence in the second step 
significantly improved the model and explained 15.1% of additional variance, !R2 = 
.15,  F! = (3,149) = 8.92, p < .00,.  The final model explained 16.0% of variance, 
which was significant, R = .40, F(4,149) = 7.08,  p < .001, f2 = 0.19, and indicated a 
large-sized effect.  Being less agreeable predicted emotional manipulation 
willingness.
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Table 7 
Multiple Hierarchical Regression Results Predicting Emotional Manipulation Ability at Time 1 
Model  B SE Beta t p 95% CI for B 
Step 1 Constant 32.09 3.63 - 8.84 <.001 [24.92, 39.27] 
 Gender -3.73 1.95 -.15 -1.91 0.058 [-7.53, 0.12] 
Step 2 Constant 48.56 7.67 - 6.33 <.001 [33.40, 63.71] 
 Gender -2.97 1.78 -.12 -1.67 .097 [0.05, 0.25] 
 Emotional intelligence 0.15 0.05 .22 2.85 .005 [0.04, 0.25] 
 Agreeableness -0.66 0.12 -.40 -5.34 <.001 [-0.90, -0.42] 
 Conscientiousness -0.41 0.12 -.25 -3.36 <.001 [-0.64, -0.17] 
Note. CI = confidence interval. 
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Table 8 
Multiple Hierarchical Regression Results Predicting Emotional Manipulation Willingness at Time 1 
Model  B SE Beta t p 95% CI for B 
Step 1 Constant 17.86 1.75 - 10.18 <.001 [14.37, 21.30] 
 Gender -1.10 0.94 -.09 -1.17 .246 [-0.25, 0.76] 
Step 2 Constant 28.58 3.81 - 7.49 <.001 [21.04, 36.13] 
 Gender -1.03 0.89 -.09 -1.62 .247 [-2.78, 0.72] 
 Emotional intelligence 0.01 0.03 .06 0.73 .463 [-0.03, 0.07] 
 Agreeableness -0.31 0.06 -.39 -4.98 <.001 [-0.43, -0.18] 
 Conscientiousness -0.10 0.06 -.13 -1.61 .111 [-0.21, 0.02] 
Note. CI = confidence interval.  
 
 
!!
34!
Mood-worsening strategy.  The entry of gender at Step 1 resulted in a 
significant model, R = .23, adjusted R2 = .046, F(1, 152) = 8.32, p = .005, f2 = 0.05, 
and accounted for 5.2% of variance of mood-worsening, which was a small effect.  
Being male predicted mood-worsening.  The addition of the remaining variables in 
Step 2 accounted for an additional 27.9% of variance, which was significant, !R2 = 
.27,  F! =(3,149) = 20.68, p < .001.  With all variables entered, a significant and 
large effect was evident (f2 = 0.49), with 33.1% of variance accounted for, R = .58, 
adjusted R2 = .313, F(4,149) = 8.32, p < .001. Being male, less agreeable and less 
conscientious significantly predicted mood-worsening. 
Inauthentic strategy.  The first step was not significant, R = .02, adjusted R2 
= .006, F(1, 152) = 0.06, p = .810.  Only 0.01% of variance was explained by gender. 
This was a very small effect size, f2 =0 .001.  Adding agreeableness, 
conscientiousness and emotional intelligence at Step 2 resulted in an additional 
13.7% of variance explained, which was a significant improvement, !R2 = .11,  F! = 
(3, 149) = 7.89, p < .001.  The final model explained 13.7% of variance in 
inauthentic strategy use, and was significant, R = .37, F(4, 149) = 5.93), p < .001, f2 
= 0.16, a medium-sized effect.  Being less agreeable significantly predicted 
inauthentic strategy. 
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Table 9 
Multiple Hierarchical Regression Results Predicting Mood-Worsening at Time 1 
Model  B SE Beta t p 95% CI for B 
Step 1 Constant 33.79 3.58 - 9.45 <.001 [26.72, 40.86] 
 Gender -5.54 1.92 -.23 -2.88 .005 [-9.33, 1.74] 
Step 2 Constant 71.28 7.12 - 10.02 <.001 [57.22, 85.34] 
 Gender -5.38 1.65 -.22 -3.26 001 [-8.65, -2.21] 
 Emotional intelligence -0.01 -.05 -.01 -0.20 .814 [-0.10, 0.08] 
 Agreeableness -0.82 .11 -.49 -7.16 <.001 [-1.05, -0.59] 
 Conscientiousness -0.30 .11 -.19 -2.71 .008 [-0.53, -0.08] 
Note. CI = confidence interval. 
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Table 10 
Multiple Hierarchical Regression Results Predicting Inauthenticity Strategy at Time 1 
 
Model  B SE Beta t p 95% CI for B 
Step 1 Constant 28.23 3.11 - 9.08 <.001 [22.09, 34.37] 
 Gender 0.40 1.67 .02 0.24 .810 [-2.89, 3.70] 
Step 2 Constant 40.69 6.84 - 5.95 <.001 [27.18, 54.20] 
 Gender 0.47 1.59 .02 0.29 .769 [-2.67, 3.60] 
 Emotional intelligence .07 0.05 .12 1.50 .137 [-0.02, 0.16] 
 Agreeableness 0.53 0.11 -.38 -4.82 <001 [-0.75, -0.31] 
 Conscientiousness -0.11 0.11 -.08 -1.01 .315 [-0.32, 0.10] 
Note. CI = confidence interval.  
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Inferential Statistics: The Role of Mood in Emotional Manipulation   
Results for the hierarchical multiple regression analyses predicting emotional 
manipulation ability, willingness, mood-worsening strategies and inauthentic 
strategies are presented in Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14, respectively. For all analyses, 
gender was entered in Step 1, the relevant Time 1 emotional manipulation variable 
was entered at Step 2, agreeableness, conscientiousness and emotional manipulation 
were entered in Step 3, and mood (dummy coded) at Step 4. Effect sizes were 
interpreted following Cohen’s (1992) guidelines.  
Emotional manipulation ability In step one, gender significantly accounted 
for 3.6% of variance, R = .19, adjusted R2 = .020, F(1,152) = 5.62, p = .019, f2 = 
0.04, which represents a small effect.  Being male predicted emotional manipulation 
ability. In Step 2, including emotional manipulation ability from Time 1 accounted 
for an additional 59.1% of variance, !R2 = .59,  F! = (1,151) = 238.70, p < .001, 
which was a significant improvement, with the model at Step 2 explaining 62.2% of 
variance, R = .79, adjusted R2 = .62, F(2, 151) = 126.55, p < .001,  f2 = 1.67,  
indicating a very large effect.  Greater emotional manipulation ability at Time 1 
predicted greater emotional manipulation ability at Time 2. Adding the emotional 
intelligence and personality variables at Step 3 resulted in a significant improvement, 
!R2 = .02,  F! = (3,148) = 3.26, p = .023, although only an additional 2.3% of 
variance in emotional manipulation ability was explained. Overall,  
64.9% of variance was explained, which was significant, R = .81, adjusted R2 = .64, 
F(5, 148) = 23.81, p < .001,  f2 = 1.66, indicating a very large effect size. Within this 
model, having higher emotional intelligence, and being less agreeable predicted 
emotional manipulation ability. 
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Mood was entered in the final step, and accounted for an additional 0.6% of 
variance,   !R2 = .64,  F! =(2, 146) = 1.29, p = .278. Within this final model, 65.6% 
of variance was explained, which was significant, R = .81, adjusted R2 = .64, F(7, 
146), = 39.70, p < .001, f2 = .54, indicating a medium-sized effect.  Being less 
agreeable was the only significant individual predictor. 
Emotional manipulation willingness.  Step 1 was not significant, R = .08, 
adjusted R2 = -.001, F(1,152) = 5.62, p = .352.  Gender accounted for 0.6% of 
variance in emotional manipulation willingness. Adding Time 1 emotional 
manipulation willingness accounted for an additional 50.3% of variance, !R2 = .50,  
F! = (1,151) = 154.33, p < .001,  which was a significant improvement.  This model 
was significant, F(2, 151) = 126.55, p < .001, with 50.8% of variance explained, R = 
.71, adjusted R2 = .50, f2 =1.03. This was a very large effect.  Emotional 
manipulation willingness at Time 1 predicted emotional manipulation willingness at 
Time 2.  The addition of agreeableness, conscientiousness and emotional intelligence 
in the third step accounted for an additional 0.30% of variance; this was not a 
significant improvement !R2 = .003,  F! = (3,148) = .35, p = .787.  The model was 
significant and explained 51.2% of variance, R = .72, adjusted R2 = .50, F(5, 148) = 
31.03, p < .001,  f2 = 1.05, suggesting a very large effect.  Emotional manipulation 
willingness at Time 1 was the only significant individual predictor. 
The addition of mood at Step 4 explained an additional 1.1% of variance,   
!R2 = .01,  F! =(2, 146) = 1.67, p = .191.  The final model was significant, F(7, 
146), = 22.84, p < .001. A very large effect was evident, f2 = 1.11, with the model 
explaining 52.3% of variance, R = .72, adjusted R2 = .50. Only Time 1 emotional 
manipulation willingness predicted emotional manipulation willingness at Time 2.
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Table11 
Multiple Hierarchical Regression Results Predicting Emotional Manipulation Ability from Emotional Intelligence, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, and Mood 
Model  B SE Beta t p 95% CI for B 
Step 1 Constant 35.09 3.15 - 11.12 <.001 [28.85, 41.32] 
 Gender -4.01 1.69 -.19 -2.37 .019 [-7.36, -0.67] 
Step 2 Constant 13.26 2.42 - 5.47 <.001 [8.47, 18.05] 
 Gender -1.47 1.07 -.07 -1.38 .169 [-3.59, 0.64] 
 EM ability (Time 1) 0.68 0.04 .78 15.45 <.001 [0.59, 0.76] 
Step 3 Constant 9.34 5.08 - 1.84 .068 [-0.71, 19.40 
 Gender -1.64 1.06 -.08 -1.55 .123 [-3.73, 0.45] 
 EM ability (Time 1) 0.64 0.05 .76 13.33 <.001 [0.55, 0.74] 
 Emotional Intelligence  0.08 0.03 .12 2.41 .017 [0.01, 0.14] 
 Agreeableness -0.16 0.08 -.11 -2.00 .047 [-0.31, -.002] 
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 Conscientiousness 0.04 0.07 .03 0.54 .587 [-0.19, 0.19] 
Step 4 Constant 9.39 5.11 - 1.84 .068 [-0.72, 19.49] 
 Gender -1.45 1.06 -.07 -1.34 .176 [-3.55, 0.65] 
 EM ability (Time 1) 0.63 0.05 .72 12.78 <.001 [0.53, 0.73] 
 Emotional intelligence 0.08 0.03 .14 2.57 .011 [0.02, 0.14] 
 Agreeableness -0.16 0.08 -.11 -1.98 .050 [-0.31, 0.00] 
 Conscientiousness 0.04 0.77 .02 0.44 .630 [-0.11, 0.18] 
 Sad -0.15 0.99 -.01 -0.15 .883 [-2.09, 1.80] 
  Happy -1.43 0.97 -.08 -1.47 .145 [-3.35, 0.50] 
Note.  CI = confidence interval; EM ability = emotional manipulation ability.
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Table 12 
Multiple Hierarchical Regression Results Predicting Emotional Manipulation Willingness from Emotional Intelligence, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, and Mood 
Model  B SE Beta t p 95% CI for B 
Step 1 Constant 18.52 1.79 - 10.34 <.001 [14.99, 22.07] 
 Gender -0.90 0.96 -.08 -0.93 .352 [-2.80, 1.00] 
Step 2 Constant 5.56 1.64 - 3.40 .001 [2.33, 8.80] 
 Gender -0.10 0.68 -.01 -0.15 .882 [-1.45, 1.24] 
 EM willingness (Time 1) 0.73 0.06 .71 12.42 <.001 [0.61, 0.84] 
Step 3 Constant 6.11 3.50 - 1.75 .082 [-0.80, 13.02] 
 Gender -0.06 0.70 -.01 -0.09 .931 [-1.43, 1.31] 
 EM willingness (Time 1) 0.71 0.06 .69 11.07 <.001 [0.58, 0.83] 
 Emotional intelligence  0.02 0.02 .05 0.78 .437 [-0.02, -0.05] 
 Agreeableness -0.04 0.05 -.48 -0.76 .448 [-0.14, 0.06] 
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 Conscientiousness -0.03 0.05 -.33 -.-0.55 .583 [-0.12, 0.07] 
Step 4 Constant 5.50 3.53 - 1.56 .121 [-1.48, 12.48] 
 Gender 0.12 0.70 .01 0.17 .863 [-1.26, 1.50] 
 EM willingness (Time 1) 0.71 0.64 .69 11.10 <.001 [0.58, 0.83] 
 Emotional intelligence 0.02 0.02 .06 0.91 .363 [-0.21, .06] 
 Agreeableness -0.03 0.05 -.04 -0.59 .558 [-0.13, 0.07] 
 Conscientiousness -0.03 0.05 -.03 -0.53 .594 [-.012, 0.07] 
 Sad 0.04 0.65 .004 0.07 .947 [-1.24, 1.33] 
 Happy -0.98 0.63 -.10 -1.55 .123 [-2.23, 0.27] 
Note.  CI = confidence interval; EM willingness = emotional manipulation willingness. 
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Mood-worsening strategy. In step one, gender accounted for 1.9% of 
variance of mood-worsening which was not significant, R = .14, adjusted R2 = -.46, 
F(1,152) = 2.96, p = .087,  f2 = 0.02 (a small effect).  When Time 1 mood-worsening 
was added in the second step, it explained an additional 46.4% of variance, !R2 = 
.45,  F! = (1,151) = 125.32, p < .001, significantly improving the model, accounting 
for  54.0% of variance, R = .73, adjusted R2 = .52, which was significant model, F(2, 
151) = 65.35, p < .001, and reflected a very large effect  f2 =1.31.  Mood-worsening 
at Time 1 predicted mood-worsening at Time 2.  The addition of emotional 
intelligence, agreeableness and conscientiousness at Step 3 significantly improved 
the model, !R2 = .08,  F! = (3,148) = 8.11, p < .001, explaining an additional 7.6% 
of variance which was a significant amount.  This model explained 54.0% of 
variance in mood-worsening, and was significant, R = .74, adjusted R2 = .52, F(5, 
148) = 34.69, p < .001,  f2 =1.17, a very large effect.  Having high levels of mood-
worsening, high emotional intelligence and being less agreeable predicted emotional 
manipulation ability. 
Including moods did not significantly improve the model, !R2 = .006,  F! 
=(2, 146) = 1.03, p = .361, with only an additional 0.6% of variance explained. The 
final model was significant explaining 54.6% of variance in mood worsening, R = 
.74, adjusted R2 = .52, F(7, 146), = 25.08, p < .001, f2 = 0.83, indicating a very large 
effect.  Mood worsening at Time 1, being emotionally intelligent and high in 
agreeableness predicted mood-worsening at Time 2. 
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Table 13 
Multiple Hierarchical Regression Results Predicting Mood-Worsening from Emotional Intelligence, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and 
Mood 
Model  B SE Beta t p 95% CI for B 
Step 1 Constant 32.77 3.57 - 9.19 <.001 [25.75, 39.82] 
 Gender -3.29 1.91 -.14 -1.72 .087 [-7.07, 0.50] 
Step 2 Constant 10.08 3.33 - 3.02 .003 [3.49, 16.67] 
 Gender 0.42 1.45 .02 0.29 .771 [-2.46, 3.31 
 Mood-worsening (Time 1) 0.67 0.06 .69 11.20 <.001 [0.55, 0.79] 
Step 3 Constant 20.13 7.51 - 2.68 .008 [5.29, 34.97] 
 Gender -0.31 1.39 -.01 0.22 .823 [-3.07, 2.44] 
 Mood-worsening (Time 1) 0.54 0.07 .59 8.06 <.001 [0.41, 0.67] 
 Emotional intelligence  0.10 0.04 .15 2.52 .013 [0.02, 0.17] 
 Agreeableness -0.49 0.11 -.30 -4.57 <.001 [-0.71, -0.28] 
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 Conscientiousness -0.04 0.09 -.03 -0.42 .675 [-0.22, 0.15] 
Step 4 Constant 20.73 7.53 - 2.75 .007 [5.84, 33.60] 
 Gender -0.18 1.40 -.01 -0.13 .898 [-2.95, 2.59] 
 Mood-worsening (Time 1) 0.53 0.07 .54 7.80 <.001 [0.39, 0.66] 
 Emotional intelligence 0.10 0.04 .15 2.57 .011 [0.02, 0.18] 
 Agreeableness -0.49 0.11 -.30 -4.53 <.001 [-0.71, -0.28] 
 Conscientiousness -0.04 0.09 -.03 -0.41 .682 [-0.22, 0.15] 
 Sad -1.01 1.27 -.05 -0.80 .428 [-3.52, 1.50] 
 Happy -1.78 1.24 -.09 -1.43 .156 [-4.23, 0.68] 
Note.  CI = confidence interval. 
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Inauthentic strategy. Gender had a trivial, non-significant effect at Step 1 (f2 
= 0.001), accounting for 0.1% of variance., R = .03, adjusted R2 = -.006, F(1,152) = 
0.128, p = .721,  , The inclusion of Time 1 inauthentic strategy accounted for an 
additional 65.4% of variance, !R2 = .65,  F! = (1,151) = 286.72, p < .001,  which 
was a significant improvement. The model, explained 65.5% of variance, R = .81, 
adjusted R2 = .65, F(2, 151) = 143.55, p < .001,  f2 =1.92, indicating a very large 
effect.  Inauthentic strategy at Time 1 predicted inauthentic strategy at Time 2. 
 Adding agreeableness, conscientiousness and emotional intelligence in the 
third step did not significantly improve the model, accounting for an additional 0.8% 
of variance, !R2 = .008,  F! = (3,148) = 0.35, p < .001.  The overall model explained 
66.3% of variance which was significant, R = .81, adjusted R2 = .61, F(5, 148) = 
58.20, p < .001,  f2 =1.97, indicating a very large effect.  Time 1 scores on 
inauthentic strategy predicted inauthentic strategy at Time 2. 
Mood was added at the final step, explaining an additional 1.0% of variance, 
which was not a significant improvement, !R2 = .010,  F! =(2, 146) = 2.28, p = .106.   
The final model was significant and explained 67.3% of variance R = .82, adjusted 
R2 = .66, F(7, 146), = 42.93, p < .001, f2 = 2.06, indicating a very large-sized effect.  
Scores of inauthentic strategy at Time 1, and being in a negative mood predicted 
inauthentic strategy. 
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Table 14 
Multiple Hierarchical Regression Results Predicting Inauthenticity from Emotional Intelligence, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Mood 
Model  B SE Beta t p 95% CI for B 
Step 1 Constant 28.73 3.21 - 8.96 <.001 [22.39, 35.06] 
 Gender -0.62 1.72 -.03 -0.36 .721 [-4.01, 2.78] 
Step 2 Constant 5.18 2.35 - 2.21 .029 [0.54, 9.81] 
 Gender -0.95 1.01 -.05 -0.94 .350 [-2.59, 1.05] 
 Inauthenticity (Time 1) 0.83 0.05 .81 16.93 <.001 [0.74, 0.93] 
Step 3 Constant 9.97 4.92 - 2.03 .044 [0.25, 19.69] 
 Gender -1.13 1.03 -.05 -1.10 .271 [-3.16, 0.90] 
 Inauthenticity (Time 1) 0.81 0.05 .79 15.28 <.001 [0.71, 0.91] 
 Emotional Intelligence  -0.02 0.03 -.03 -0.58 .561 [-0.08, 0.04] 
 Agreeableness -0.11 0.08 -.07 -1.40 .164 [-0.26, 0.04] 
 Conscientiousness 0.05 0.07 .04 0.70 .488 [-0.09, 0.19] 
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Step 4 Constant 9.66 4.93 - 1.96 .052 [-0.07, 19.40] 
 Gender -0.87 1.03 -.04 -0.84 .401 [-2.90, 1.17] 
 Inauthenticity (Time 1) 0.80 0.05 .78 15.28 <.001 [0.70, 0.91] 
 Emotional intelligence -0.01 0.03 -.02 -0.46 .648 [-0.07, 0.04] 
 Agreeableness -0.10 0.08 -.07 -1.25 .212 [-0.25, 0.06] 
 Conscientiousness 0.05 0.07 .04 0.74 .459 [-0.09, 0.19] 
 Sad -0.68 0.96 -.04 -0.71 .477 [-2.58, 1.21] 
 Happy -1.96 0.93 -.12 -2.10 .038 [-3.81, -0.11] 
Note.  CI = confidence interval. 
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Discussion 
 The current study aimed to examine the combined predictive utility of 
emotional intelligence, agreeableness, and conscientiousness on emotional 
manipulation. Further, this study also investigated the influence of mood on 
emotional manipulation. With a view to completeness, emotional manipulation was 
operationalised in terms of self-reported ability and willingness as well as inauthentic 
and mood-worsening strategies. The effect of emotional intelligence, agreeableness, 
and conscientiousness on emotional manipulation was considered using the cross-
sectional data collected from Time 1. The effect of mood was tested following a 
mood induction administered prior to the completion of the emotional manipulation 
variables at Time 2. 
Assessing the Role of Emotional Intelligence, Agreeableness, and 
Conscientiousness on Emotional Manipulation 
 The first hypothesis, that together, emotional intelligence, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness would predict emotional manipulation was supported.  The linear 
combination of those variables explained an adjusted 20.1%, 13.7%, 31.3%, and 
11.4% of variance in emotional manipulation ability, willingness, and mood-
worsening and inauthentic strategies, respectively.  Thus, the second hypothesis that 
emotional intelligence, agreeableness and conscientiousness would explain a larger 
amount of variance in emotional manipulation when measured by mood-worsening 
and inauthentic strategy received partial support. While the model for mood-
worsening strategies showed a large effect (interpreted in line with Cohen, 1992), the 
effect sizes for willingness and inauthenticity were moderate, and the effect size for 
ability was moderate to large.   
!!
50!
The hypothesis that emotional intelligence would significantly contribute to 
emotional manipulation within these models was supported only for emotional 
manipulation ability, with emotional intelligence acting as a significant positive 
predictor. In line with the fourth hypothesis, agreeableness was a significant negative 
predictor for emotional manipulation ability, willingness, and mood-worsening and 
inauthentic strategies. However, the prediction that conscientiousness would also 
significantly contribute to the models at Time 1 was only partially supported: 
conscientiousness was a significant, negative, individual predictor for emotional 
manipulation ability and with mood-worsening only. 
This was the first study to consider the combination of EI, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness in predicting emotional manipulation. Austin et al. (2007) sought 
to identify the “dark” side of emotional ability through the relationship between 
emotional intelligence and emotional manipulation. However, no relationship was 
found. In noting that agreeableness was positively related to emotional intelligence, 
and negatively related to emotional manipulation, they suggested that being 
agreeable could account for the pro-social aspect of emotional ability use, thereby 
decreasing the likelihood of emotionally manipulating others. Consequently, 
O’Connor and Athota (2013) investigated the role of agreeableness in the emotional 
intelligence and emotional manipulation relationship.  However, as they identified 
both mediating and moderating effects of agreeableness, the exact role that 
agreeableness plays in the relationship is unclear. Grieve (2011) examined the 
combined roles of personality and self-monitoring in predicting emotional 
manipulation, and noted that high agreeableness and high conscientiousness 
predicted emotional manipulation.   The overall results of those studies align with 
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our findings that emotional intelligence, agreeableness and conscientiousness 
together contribute to emotional manipulation. 
 The overall contribution of the combination of emotional intelligence, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness was greater in relation to mood-worsening than 
it was in relation to emotional manipulation ability.  This aligns with findings by 
Austin et al. (2014) who noted that the bivariate relationships between both 
agreeableness and conscientiousness were stronger with mood-worsening than they 
were with inauthentic.  Interestingly, emotional intelligence, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness together contributed less to the use of inauthenticity strategies than 
they did to emotional manipulation ability.  Perhaps using inauthentic displays 
involve acting skills rather than emotional skills. 
 Within the models, emotional intelligence was only a significant predictor of 
emotional manipulation ability, however as predicted the relationship was positive, 
suggesting that emotional abilities can be used both pro-socially as well as 
maliciously.  However, this finding could be due to the suppressor effect of 
emotional intelligence absorbing its shared variance with agreeableness and 
conscientiousness.  The suppressor effects of emotional intelligence were previously 
found by Grieve and Mahar (2010) and Grieve and Panebianco (2013), who found 
that emotional intelligence and psychopathic traits together predicted emotional 
manipulation.  Interestingly, emotional intelligence acted as suppressor alongside 
both maladaptive traits (Grieve & Mahar, 2010; Grieve & Panebianco, 2013) and 
pro-social traits, as found in the current study.  This suggests that emotional 
intelligence plays a role in emotional manipulation, however the nature of this role is 
unclear.  Future research could investigate whether its apparent involvement is due to 
the pro-social nature of emotional intelligence itself, or the nature of self-report 
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measures, as it may be that people overestimate their ability to engage in emotional 
manipulation.  However, the difficulties of developing a performance measure of 
emotional manipulation are similar to the issues of performance measures of 
emotional intelligence (Schlegel, 2016). 
It is not clear why conscientiousness did not more consistently predict 
emotional manipulation.  It could be that a pro-social nature, which was shown to 
strongly predict emotional manipulation through agreeableness, is not as dominant in 
conscientiousness.  It could be that conscientious people are reliable in respect to 
themselves more than to others, thus indicating that it may be less involved in 
managing other people’s emotions the conceptualised.  
The Effect of Mood 
 The hypothesis that mood would significantly contribute to emotional 
manipulation in addition to the contributions made by emotional intelligence, 
agreeableness and conscientiousness was supported only for inauthentic emotional 
manipulation strategies. In that analysis, a more positive mood was significantly 
associated with a lower use of emotional inauthenticity. The predictions that mood 
would influence emotional manipulation ability, willingness, and mood-worsening 
strategies were not supported. 
It is unclear why mood contributed solely to inauthenticity, and not to the 
remaining emotional manipulation measures.  Forgas (2001) suggested that mood 
primes mood congruent behaviour, Affective priming suggests that a negative mood 
should increase the likelihood of self-serving tendencies, as according to network 
models of memory (Collins and Loftus, 1975) mood would activate mood congruent 
behaviours, however this appeared not to be the case in the current study. 
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A satisfactory explanation would be that emotional intelligence allowed 
individuals in the experimentally manipulated mood conditions to regulate and 
manage their moods, thus inhibiting the potential effect of mood on emotional 
manipulation. These mechanisms would align clearly with conceptualisations of 
emotional intelligence (i.e. the ability to identify, regulate, and manage emotions, 
(Mayer & Salovey, 1997).  
Specifically, in line with the proposed explanation that emotional intelligence 
restrains mood, EI only contributed significantly to emotional manipulation ability 
and to mood-worsening strategies. In support of this, inspection of the bivariate 
correlations reveals that EI is acting unambiguously as a statistical suppressor in the 
case of mood-worsening, and to emotional manipulation ability. Nonetheless, it is 
difficult to explain why this effect might be evident for only two of the four aspects 
of emotional manipulation investigated here. 
Another consideration in regards to the lack of effect of mood is the nature of 
the participants in the three mood conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to 
mood conditions, to less the chance of pre-existing differences between the groups. 
However, in the current study, it is possible that people with lower emotional 
manipulation ability and mood-worsening were allocated to the happy group, as the 
results suggest that the scores of that group was lower than the sad group.  This 
potentially represents a problem for the current study. If people who are less 
manipulative are allocated to a group in which a happy mood is predicted to decrease 
reported manipulative behaviour, the hypothesised outcome is not likely to be 
elicited, due to the restriction of range that would emerge from floor effects 
(Christensen, 2004) 
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 The lack of findings in regards to mood could also be explained by referring 
to the mood induction.  It is inconclusive whether the mood induction was 
successful.  Scores on the negative PANAS did not differ between groups, however 
the scores of the visual analogue scales indicated that the happy group were in a 
more positive mood than the sad group, and the finding was significant.  However, 
the mean rating of the positive mood group was near the scale’s midpoint which 
according to Dixon and Bird (1981) is one of the less reliable points on a bi-polar 
scale. Based on those mixed findings, it must be considered that a successful 
induction may not have occurred.  
 Alternatively, if the mood induction was successful, the effect of mood on 
emotional manipulation may have been influenced by factors not considered in this 
study.  Firstly, the focus of the mood may have influenced reported manipulative 
behaviours.  The hypotheses around mood were based on a model that explains the 
mood congruent effect of mood through pro-social behaviour (Forgas, 2001).  
However, the Focus of Attention Model (Thompson, Cowan, & Rosenhan, 1980) 
proposes that the effect of mood on behaviour varies with mood focus in addition to 
mood valance.  Specifically, that a negative mood that focussed on others resulted in 
higher helping than a self-focussed negative mood.  Rosenhan, Salovey, and Hargis 
(1981) noted that a positive other-focussed mood reduced rather than increased 
helping.  In the current study, it was proposed that a mood would prime mood 
congruent behaviour. However, if the focus of a mood is related to others, it appears 
a mood may prime mood incongruent behaviour. Future research could consider 
emphasising the focus of the mood on the self during the mood induction, and 
including a mood check. 
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Notably, when emotional manipulation at Time 2 was regressed onto 
emotional manipulation at Time 1, emotional intelligence, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness, the only consistent significant predictor was Time 1 emotional 
manipulation. In all cases, the relevant Time 1 emotional manipulation variable 
positively predicted its Time 2 counterpart. Effect sizes in all cases were large 
(Cohen, 1992). Time 1 variables explained a large amount of variance in Time 2 
scores when included in the model (63%, 50.8%, 46.4%, and 65%) for emotional 
manipulation ability, emotional manipulation willingness, mood-worsening and 
inauthentic strategy use respectively.  The additional variance explained by 
personality and mood was substantially smaller. This was somewhat larger for mood-
worsening, with an extra 8.1% of variance explained. 
Broadly, this indicates that people tend to perceive their ability and their 
willingness to emotionally manipulate, as well as their use of emotional manipulation 
strategies in a fairly consistent way, regardless of the personality or mood variables 
assessed in the current study. This seems particularly the case for willingness, where 
Time 1 willingness was the only significant predictor in that model, while 
agreeableness played a role in predicting both emotional manipulation ability and 
mood-worsening, and mood only significantly contributed to inauthenticity.  
Limitations and Additional Considerations for Research 
Surprisingly, there were no differences in gender on emotional manipulation. 
This is contrary to the findings of Hyde and Grieve (2016) who found that gender 
made significant contributions within each multivariate model.  However, it has been 
suggested that gender differences may be dependent on the other constructs within 
the model.  Grieve and Mahar (2010) and Grieve and Panebianco (2013) both 
included psychopathic traits when predicting emotional manipulation, and scores on 
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measures of psychopathic traits were shown to vary according to gender.  The effect 
of gender differences in those traits could be the influential factor in gender 
differences within those models.   
A consistent finding in the current study was that the Time 1 emotional 
manipulation variables consistently predicted the associated Time 2 variables. It was 
essential to include the Time 1 variables in order to control for the effect of 
individual differences in pre-existing manipulative tendencies, following the mood 
induction. This is an appropriate approach, given that the relationship between Time 
1 emotional intelligence, agreeableness, conscientiousness and mood was anticipated 
to play an important role in predicting the outcome variables (e.g. Liang & Zeger, 
1986). However, the contribution of Time 1 to the Time 2 models is somewhat 
overestimated, due to common method bias emanating from the measures themselves 
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Nonetheless, the strength of the 
Beta weights in the models suggests that even if the variance is inflated, it is still 
likely that a true effect underpins the results. Using different techniques to assess 
emotional manipulation at Time 1 would help to minimise concerns around shared 
method variance. 
Related to these assessment concerns, is that the current study assessed 
perceptions of emotional manipulation ability and strategies, rather than actual 
emotional ability and strategies. This is a limitation of the current study. Ideally, a 
behavioural measure of emotional manipulation would help to overcome this. 
However, behavioural responses would be difficult to operationalise, and would 
likely be open to critiques similar to those levelled at performance measures of 
emotional intelligence (Maul, 2012; Schlegel, 2016).  Furthermore, it could be 
suggested that having participants rate their perceived pro-social capabilities could 
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make results unclear, due to the disparity between outcomes on trait measures of 
emotional intelligence and performance measure (Petrides & Furnham, 2001) 
Participants in this study reported how frequently they engaged in emotional 
manipulation. While this approach is appropriate (Davis & Nichols, 2016), the 
accurate assessment of an individual’s willingness to engage in those behaviours 
cannot be assured in the current study.  As participation was anonymous, it can be 
reasonably assumed that socially desirable responding was not likely to 
systematically influence the data. However, as the willingness measure required 
participants to report how often they engaged in an emotionally manipulative 
behaviour (e.g. daily, weekly), this presumes that the individual is able to accurately 
recall how often they engage in these behaviours.  It is also assumed that individuals 
have insight to know when their behaviours are emotionally manipulative. 
The findings from the current study are not generalisable, as emotional 
manipulation was examined broadly.  Previous research has investigated the 
mechanisms of emotional manipulation within specific contexts, such as in the 
workplace.  The mechanisms of emotional manipulation may vary situationally, 
depending on how important the desired outcome is to that person.  In a workplace 
setting for example, the motivation to manipulate others may be greater due to higher 
stakes situations. 
Implications ! The results of this study suggest that mood may be an influential factor in 
whether a person engages in emotional manipulation.  Being the perceived target of 
emotional manipulation has been shown to have detrimental psychological effects 
(Hyde, Grieve, and Scott, 2016).  Linton and Power (2013) revealed the wide 
prevalence of these behaviours in the workplace, which suggests that further 
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investigation in that context is important.   As mood has been identified as a possible 
mechanism of emotional manipulation, specifically that a positive mood decreases 
manipulative tendencies, an intervention to assist the individuals who engage in 
those behaviours could be investigated.  Previous research has studied the influence 
of personality traits, and although it is necessary to identify more stable and enduring 
mechanisms, the benefit of identifying more fluid predictors can be seen when 
considering interventions.  People who manipulate others could learn to regulate 
their moods in order to benefit others.  
Summary and Concluding Comments 
 This study examined the effect of emotional intelligence, personality, and 
mood on emotional manipulation, within an experimental paradigm for the first time.   
Although the findings indicate that the role of emotional intelligence may not as 
dominant in predicting emotional manipulation as previously suggested, the 
importance of the role of agreeableness has been highlighted.  The predicted role of 
conscientiousness was not found in the current study, which could be due to a less 
dominant presence of pro-social facets.   
 The finding that a positive mood decreases the likelihood or reported 
inauthentic strategy has provided a basis for future studies to consider the influence 
of mood on maladaptive behaviours.  However, this effect should be examined in 
specific contexts.  Clearly, the results of this study, together with previous findings 
highlight the importance of continuing to investigate the use of manipulative 
behaviours.  The current findings highlight that this behaviour can be influenced by 
situational factors, which suggests that it is not only individuals who have an overall 
tendency to behave in this way. 
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Appendix A1 
Online Participant Demographic Questionnaire 
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Appendix A2 
The Emotional Intelligence Self-Report Scale (Schutte et al. 1998) 
 
“Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:” 
Responses are made according to a 5-point scale, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = 
disagree, 3 = neutral (neither agree nor disagree), 4 = agree, and 5 = strongly agree.  
 
1.! I know when to speak about my personal problems to others 
2.! When I am faced with obstacles, I remember times I faced similar obstacles 
and overcame them 
3.! I expect that I will do well on most things I try 
4.! Other people find it easy to confide in me 
5.! I find it hard to understand the non-verbal messages of other people * 
6.! Some of the major events of my life have led me to re-evaluate what is 
important and not important 
7.! When my mood changes, I see new possibilities 
8.! Emotions are one of the things that make my life worth living 
9.! I am aware of my emotions as I experience them 
10.!I expect good things to happen 
11.!I like to share my emotions with others 
12.!When I experience a positive emotion, I know how to make it last 
13.!I arrange events others enjoy 
14.!I seek out activities that make me happy 
15.!I am aware of the non-verbal messages I send to others 
16.!I present myself in a way that makes a good impression on others 
17.!When I am in a positive mood, solving problems is easy for me 
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18.!By looking at their facial expressions, I recognize the emotions people are 
experiencing  
19.!I know why my emotions change 
20.!When I am in a positive mood, I am able to come up with new idea 
21.!I have control over my emotions 
22.!I easily recognize my emotions as I experience them 
23.!I motivate myself by imagining a good outcome to tasks I take on 
24.!I compliment others when they have done something well 
25.!I am aware of the non-verbal messages other people send 
26.!When another person tells me about an important event in his or her life, I 
almost feel as though I have experienced this event myself 
27.!When I feel a change in emotions, I tend to come up with new ideas 
28.!When I am faced with a challenge, I give up because I believe I will fail * 
29.!I know what other people are feeling just by looking at them 
30.!I help other people feel better when they are down 
31.!I use good moods to help myself keep trying in the face of obstacles 
32.!I can tell how people are feeling by listening to the tone of their voice 
33.!It is difficult for me to understand why people feel the way they do * 
 
 
 
 
 
Items marked with * are reversed scored 
The final score is obtained by summing responses to all items. 
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Appendix A3 
The HEXACO-60 (Ashton & Lee, 2009); Agreeableness subscale 
 
“Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements” 
Responses are made on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly disagree, and 5 = 
strongly agree. 
 
1.! I rarely hold a grudge, even against people who have badly wronged me. 
2.! People sometimes tell me that I am too critical of others. * 
3.! People sometimes tell me that I’m too stubborn. * 
4.! People think of me as someone who has a quick temper. * 
5.! My attitude toward people who have treated me badly is “forgive and forget.”  
6.! I tend to be lenient in judging other people. 
7.! I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree with me. 
8.! Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do. 
9.! Even when people make a lot of mistakes, I rarely say anything negative. 
10.!When people tell me that I’m wrong, my first reaction is to argue with them.* 
 
 
 
 
 
Items marked with * are reversed scored 
The final score is obtained by summing responses to all items. 
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Appendix A4 
The HEXACO-60 (Ashton & Lee, 2009); Conscientiousness subscale 
 
“Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements” 
Responses are made on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly disagree, and 5 = 
strongly agree. 
 
1.! I plan ahead and organise things, to avoid scrambling at the last minute. 
2.! I often push myself very hard when trying to achieve a goal. 
3.! When working on something, I don’t pay much attention to small details. * 
4.! I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful 
thought. * 
5.! When working, I sometimes have difficulties due to being disorganised. * 
6.! I do only the minimum amount of work needed to get by. * 
7.! I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the expense of time. 
8.! I make a lot of mistakes because I don’t think before I act. * 
9.! People often call me a perfectionist. 
10.!I prefer to do whatever comes to mind, rather than stick to a plan. * 
 
 
 
 
Items marked with * are reversed scored 
The final score is obtained by summing responses to all items. 
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Appendix A5 
Emotional Manipulation Ability (Hyde & Grieve, 2014) 
 
“Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements” 
Responses to statements are made according to a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = 
strongly disagree, and 5 = strongly agree. 
 
1.! I know how to embarrass someone to stop them behaving in a particular way. 
2.! I know how to make another person feel uneasy 
3.! I know how to play two people off against each other 
4.! I know how to make someone feel ashamed about something that they have 
done in order to stop them from doing it again 
5.! I know how to ’wind up’ my close family and friends 
6.! I can use my emotional skills to make others feel guilty 
7.! I can make someone feel anxious so that they will act in a particular way. 
8.! I can pay someone compliments to get in their ‘good books.’ 
9.! I am good at reassuring people so that they’re more likely to go along with 
what I say. 
10.!I sometimes pretend to be angrier than I really am about someone’s behaviour 
in order to induce them to behave differently in future. 
 
 
 
 
The final score is obtained by summing responses to all items. 
!!
73!
Appendix A6 
Emotional Manipulation Willingness (Hyde & Grieve, 2014) 
Participants rate the frequency according to a 5-point scale, where 1 = Never, 2= 
Now and then, 3 = Monthly, 4= Weekly, and 5 = Daily. 
1.! How often do you embarrass someone to stop them behaving in a particular 
way. 
2.! How often do you use your emotional abilities to make another person feel 
uneasy? 
3.! How often do you play two people off against each other? 
4.! How often do you make someone feel ashamed about something that they 
have done in order to stop them from doing it again? 
5.! How often do you ‘Wind up’ your close family and friends? 
6.! How often do you use emotional skills to make others feel guilty 
7.! How often do you make someone feel anxious so they would behave in a 
particular way? 
8.! How often do you pay someone compliments to get in their ‘good books’? 
9.! How often do reassure people so that they’re more likely to go along with 
what I say? 
10.!How often do you pretend to be angrier than you really were about 
someone’s behaviour in order to induce them to behave differently in future? 
 
 
 
The final score is obtained by summing responses to all items. 
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Appendix A7 
The Managing the Emotions of Others Scale (MEOS; Austin & O’Donnell, 2013): 
Mood-Worsening subscale. 
 
“Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:” 
Responses are made according to a 5-point Likert-type scale, where 1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral (neither agree nor disagree), 4 = agree, 5 = 
strongly agree. 
 
1.! I sometimes put someone down in public to make them feel bad. 
2.! I use criticism to make others feel that they should work harder. 
3.! I can make someone feel anxious so that they will act in a particular way. 
4.! I sometimes try to undermine another person’s confidence. 
5.! If I don’t like someone’s behaviour I make negative comments in order to 
make them feel bad. 
6.! I sometimes use my knowledge of another person’s emotional triggers to 
make them angry. 
7.! I use anger to get others to do things that I want them to do. 
8.! I know how to make someone feel ashamed about something that they have 
done in order to stop them from doing it again. 
9.! I know how to embarrass someone to stop them from behaving in a particular 
way. 
10.!I use displays of anger to motivate others. 
11.!I sometimes try to make someone feel bad by blaming them for something 
which I know isn’t their fault. 
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12.!If someone is annoying me, I sometimes retaliate by saying something unkind 
that will make them feel bad. 
13.!I can use my emotional skills to make others feel guilty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The final score is obtained by summing responses to all items. 
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Appendix A8 
The Managing the Emotions of Others Scale (MEOS; Austin & O’Donnell, 2013): 
Inauthenticity subscale. 
 
“Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:” 
Responses are made according to a 5-point Likert-type scale, where 1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral (neither agree nor disagree), 4 = agree, 5 = 
strongly agree. 
 
1.! I sometimes sulk to make someone feel guilty. 
2.! I sometimes use flattery to gain or keep someone’s good opinion. 
3.! If someone says or does something I don’t like, I sometimes sulk. 
4.! I sometimes sulk to get someone to change their behavior. 
5.! If I want someone to do something for me, I am especially nice to them 
before asking. 
6.! If someone’s behaviour has caused me distress, I try to make them feel guilty 
about it. 
7.! I can pay someone compliments to get in their ‘good books’. 
8.! If I want someone to do something for me, I try to elicit sympathy from them. 
9.! I sometimes exaggerate a personal or health problem in order to gain 
sympathy and avoid doing a task. 
10.!I sometimes deliberately try to make another person feel jealous. 
11.!I am especially nice to people whose friendship is advantageous to me. 
 
The final score is obtained by summing responses to all items.
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Appendix A9 
The Autobiographical Mood Induction Procedure (Baker & Guttfreund, 1993) 
Instructions 
We would now like to ask you to take a few minutes to look into your past and think 
about what have been two sad events that you have experienced in your life. When 
you finish reading these instructions, take 2 minutes to sit quietly, thinking of these 
events. Your tutor will tell you when the time is over. We would like you to try and 
think of all the details of what you experienced at the time, to the point that you 
could imagine this happening to you right now. Think about how old you were, who 
were the people or events involved, and what your feelings were.  
When the 2 minutes is up, we would like you describe (writing on this sheet of 
paper), the two events that you have remembered. You will have five minutes to 
write your description. No one else will read what you have written, and you can 
take this piece of paper with you at the end of the class. Your tutor will let you know 
when the 5 minutes is up. 
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Appendix A10 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). 
 
 “Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment” 
Responses are made according to a five point Likert-type scale, where 1 = very 
slightly or not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = moderately, 4= quite a bit, and 5 = extremely. 
 
1.! Interested * 
2.! Irritable  
3.! Distressed 
4.! Alert *  
5.! Excited * 
6.! Ashamed  
7.! Upset  
8.! Inspired * 
9.! Strong * 
10.!Nervous  
11.!Guilty  
12.!Determined * 
13.!Scared  
14.!Attentive * 
15.!Hostile  
16.!Jittery  
17.!Enthusiastic * 
18.!Active * 
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19.!Proud * 
20.!Afraid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Items marked with * form the positive affect subscale 
Items not marked with * form the negative affect subscale 
The final score for each subscale is obtained by summing the items relevant to that 
subscale. 
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Appendix A11 
Visual Analogue Scales 
 “How would you rate your mood at the current time?” 
Participants rate their current mood by marking on the line which represents their 
current mood by making marks on the horizontal lines 
 
!----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------" 
 
Sad------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Happy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The score on the word scale is reversed by subtracting it from the line length so that 
on both scales, scores at the lower end of the line indicate a happy mood, scores 
toward the middle point indicate a neutral mood, and high scores suggest a sad 
mood.  
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Appendix B 
Ethical Approval Letter 
 
 
A PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 May 2016 
 
 
 
Dr Rachel Grieve 
Division of Psychology 
University of Tasmania 
 
Student Researcher: Catharine Allen 
 
Sent via email 
 
 
 
Dear Dr Grieve 
 
 
Re: MINIMAL RISK ETHICS APPLICATION APPROVAL 
Ethics Ref: H0015713 - Cognitive factors associated with emotion 
 
 
 
We are pleased to advise that acting on a mandate from the Tasmania Social Sciences 
HREC, the Chair of the committee considered and approved the above project on 2 May 
2016. 
 
 
This approval constitutes ethical clearance by the Tasmania Social Sciences Human 
Research Ethics Committee. The decision and authority to commence the associated 
research may be dependent on factors beyond the remit of the ethics review process. For 
example, your research may need ethics clearance from other organisations or review by 
your research governance coordinator or Head of Department. It is your responsibility to 
find out if the approval of other bodies or authorities is required. It is recommended that the 
proposed research should not commence until you have satisfied these requirements. 
 
 
Please note that this approval is for four years and is conditional upon receipt of an annual 
Progress Report. Ethics approval for this project will lapse if a Progress Report is not 
submitted.  
 
 
The following conditions apply to this approval. Failure to abide by these conditions may 
result in suspension or discontinuation of approval.  
 
 
1. It is the responsibility of the Chief Investigator to ensure that all investigators are aware 
of the terms of approval, to ensure the project is conducted as approved by the Ethics 
Committee, and to notify the Committee if any investigators are added to, or cease 
involvement with, the project. 
Social Science Ethics Officer 
Private Bag 01 Hobart 
Tasmania 7001 Australia  
Tel: (03) 6226 2763 
Fax: (03) 6226 7148 
Katherine.Shaw@utas.edu.au 
 
 HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (TASMANIA) NETWORK  
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Appendix C 
Online Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
